This paper analyzes the effect of commodity price stabilization on producers and consumers, both in the short run, and in the long run, when producers have adjusted their production decisions to take account of the change in the price distribution. We derive conditions under which (a) both producers and consumers may be better off; and (b) both producers and consumers may be worse off. Moreover, we show that the long-run effects may differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from the short-run effects. The anomalous results may occur even with reasonable assumptions concerning production functions and utility functions of producers and consumers.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a long-standing controversy concerning whether it is profitable for firms to randomize their prices, and indeed, whether consumers might be better off as a result of randomization of prices. Waugh [1944] pointed out that consumers would prefer to buy at random prices rather than at prices stabilized at the arithmetic mean. Oi [1961] showed that competitive producers would earn higher profits by selling at varying prices than by selling at prices stabilized at their arithmetic mean. However, as Samuelson [1972, p. 488] forcefully argued, where competitive laissez faire leads to stability, "no bootstrap operation of manufactured price instability can accomplish the wonderful promises of the Waugh and Oi prospectuses, namely to (worse) off in the short run, but worse off (better off) in the long run.
b. A commodity price stabilization scheme may make both consumers and producers worse off.
The first result is somewhat surprising; normally, we expect impact and long-run results to differ in magnitude, but not in direction. The intuitive reason for the conventional view may be put as follows: assume that stabilizing commodity prices improves the welfare of producers in the short run. This will lead them to produce more (since the "certainty equivalent" return to farming is greater). But they will never increase output so much as to decrease price levels to the point that utility was the same as it was prior to commodity price stabilization; for if they were to do so, the certainty equivalent return to farming would be the same as it was prior to stabilization-in which case inputs (effort) would be the same, in which case output would be the same.
What is wrong with this argument is that it assumes that there is a simple relationship between expected marginal utility (which determines the level of effort) and expected total utility; in the case of constant relative risk aversion, there is a simple (proportional) relationship, and it is this that accounts for the simple results obtained in our earlier paper [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979a] . But if relative risk aversion is not constant (and there is no reason to assume that it is), then the two may move in quite different ways.
The second result has a simple interpretation. Price stabilization may increase income instability; since prices and output are negatively correlated, if the elasticity of demand is not too low, income variability is less than output variability. (See Newbery and Stiglitz [1977, 1981] .) Thus, under not implausible conditions, price stabilization makes producers worse off in the short run; if there is constant relative risk aversion (weaker conditions will suffice), then effort and aggregate output (in all states of nature) will be reduced. This will modify the quantitative effect on producers' welfare, but they will still be worse off in the long run. In addition, consumers will be worse off as a result of the lowering of output; they will be better off as a result of the reduction in the variability of sales. In general, the net effect is ambiguous, but there are conditions in which the net effect is unambiguously negative.
As we observe later, these perversities are not (necessarily) related to a failure of the usual stability condition to hold. They can obtain for quite reasonable values of the parameters.
It may be worth briefly commenting on the difference between our paper and the extensive literature on the theory of commodity price stabilization. An equilibrium price stabilization scheme must ensure that average supply equals average demand:1
where n is the number of farmers (all of whom are assumed to be identical). Each farmer chooses effort x, to maximize expected utility, yielding first-order conditions:
Eu'pO -1/2(ulPl0l + u'2P202) = v', where u' is marginal utility of income, yi in state i:
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III. OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSIS
In this simple two-state model, we can describe allocations by points in price space (P1,P2). Then any price stabilization scheme is just a new pair of prices lp*,p*1, which lies closer to the 450 line than the original set of prices. (The 450 line represents perfect price stability.) In the subsequent analysis, we shall derive the short-run feasibility locus, i.e., the set of prices for which demand equals supply, assuming that the change in the price distribution has no effect on output (denoted SR in the diagrams); we shall also derive the long-run feasibility locus, (denoted by LR in the diagrams), the set of prices at which demand equals supply, taking into account the fact that as the price distribution changes, effort, and hence output, will change; we also derive the indifference curve of producers, and the indifference curve of consumers (denoted by W and V, respectively).
AWe shall show that essentially any configuration of curves can occur, under not implausible conditions. We consider first the relationship between the effect on utility of price stabilization in the long run and in the short. In the diagrams the point P represents the equilibrium before stabilization. The 45? line, along which Pi = P2, consists of points of perfect price stabilization. Movements toward the 45? line thus represent partial price stabilization schemes. We thus shall contrast levels of welfare at P with that at a point such as P*, in Figure I . In our analysis, the shape of the indifference curves and feasibility loci play no role; what is crucial is the relative magnitude of the slopes. For simplicity we have drawn all the curves as straight 1. We simplify by assuming that demand depends only on the price of the given crop. Implicitly, we assume that farmers do not consume their own output. Figure Ic , as a result, farmers reduce their effort, and this increases prices, thus partly mitigating the loss in utility from the price stabilization scheme, while in Figure Id (for reasons similar to that given above) individuals respond to the increased variability by working harder, thus exacerbating the loss of welfare. These are not, however, the only possible patterns. In particular, in the short run, welfare may be lowered, but the supply response (through a decrease in effort) results in such a large price increase that in the long run, welfare is increased ( Figure Ie) ; or conversely, in the short run, welfare may be increased, but the supply response may be so great that the long-run effect of welfare may be deleterious ( Figure  If) .
In Figure II , we introduce the consumers' indifference curve. It is important to remember that while price increases raise producers' welfare, they lower consumers' welfare. 
IV. THE BASIC ANALYTICS

The Producer's Indifference Curve
The locus of values of PI and P2, which generate the same expected utility as the original pair, can be found from equation (2), ignoring any changes in effort (since, by the envelope theorem, these will not affect utility near the original equilibrium point). This locus is an indifference curve in price space, shown as W in Figure I , and its elasticity at any point is found by implicitly differentiating equation (2) with respect to p 1: 
The Iso-Effort Curve
The locus of price pairs that generate the same supply of effort x is found by differentiating equation (5), and its elasticity is
where Ri is the coefficient of relative risk aversion in state i:
This shows that the loci of constant expected utility and constant effort coincide if we assume constant relative risk aversion, but not otherwise. y is positive if both R1 and R2 are greater or less than unity, but if one is greater than and the other less than unity, then it is negative.
Short-Run Feasibility Locus
Two other curves are needed for the analysis. The set of price pairs that equate supply and demand in the short run, with effort heid constant, describe a short-run equilibrium stabilization scheme, and the locus is described by equation ( 
Long-Run Feasibility Locus
In the long run the stabilization scheme must take account of the supply response, and hence recognize that the right-hand side of equation (3) From (15'), we see that the sign of j3' depends on three factors, the degree of relative risk aversion, the elasticity of demand (whether it is greater or less than unity), and the rate of change of the elasticity of demand. If, for instance, the elasticity of demand is constant, then price stabilization improves producers' welfare if R(1 -) > 1;
i.e., if the elasticity of demand is small and relative risk aversion is large. There are two effects: changing the price distribution changes the mean income of producers and changes the variance of income. If the elasticity of demand is unity, price stabilization has no effect on mean income, but it always increases the variance. (Without price stabilization, price and quantity vary inversely, so there is no variability in income; with commodity price stabilization, income will vary.) With (constant) elasticity of demand greater than unity, price stabilization will reduce the mean income and increase its variability, and hence, it will never increase producers' welfare.
VI. EFFECT ON PRODUCERS IN THE LONG RUN
In the long run, the stabilization scheme must take account of supply responses. In Figure I we have depicted the various cases showing that the long-run supply response may reduce, amplify, or reverse the short-run effect. We now need to know under what conditions each possibility will occur.
We obtain directly at the no stabilization point P, the elasticity of relative risk aversion. Thus, five parameters determine the outcome: the elasticity of demand and the rate at which it changes; relative risk aversion, and the rate at which it changes; and the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort. It is immediate that if relative risk aversion is constant (as we assumed in our earlier paper [Newbery-Stiglitz, 1979a ]), the long-run and short-run effects are in the same direction. For the short-run impact to be favorable, while the long-run impact is deleterious to producers (Figure If) , 3' < 0, and (1 -1/E)R' < 0; i.e., if e > 1, there must be decreasing relative risk aversion (and relative risk aversion must decrease sufficiently fast). Note that the value of A' depends on the value of relative risk aversion, but not on its derivative; thus, it is clearly possible for 3' and R' both to be negative.
Similarly, for the short-run impact to be deleterious to farmers, while the long-run impact is favorable requires that A' > 0 and (1 -1h)R' > 0 (see Figure le) .
We now ask, when will the long-run effect amplify, rather than reduce, the short-run effect. To ascertain this, we need to compare the slopes of the long-run and short-run feasibility loci: using (9') and (8), we obtain, at the point of no stabilization, 
-Ri
The sign of this is that of (using the stability condition (13)), the long-run impact will amplify rather than reduce the short-run effect.
VII. CONSUMERS' WELFARE
So far, we have only studied the effects of price stabilization on producers, both in the short run and in the long. This is natural, if our primary concern is with the welfare of producers. But from a global point of view, we should also consider the welfare of consumers. This may easily be done using the diagrammatic techniques already employed.
We In general, we could expect p VIP/V1 to be small, as it is weighted by consumers' expenditure share in the commodity (cf. equation (28) We can summarize these conditions as follows.
Proposition. For price stabilization to be adverse for both consumers and producers with constant elasticity demand and zero consumer price risk aversion, demand must be elastic and relative risk aversion must be increasing.
For example, if farmers have constant absolute risk aversion,2 so that K = 1, then stabilization will be inefficient if e = 4, -y = 0, R < 2. (Producers are worse off for all R > 0, using (33).)
It should be clear that we can find conditions under which stabilization is Pareto improving simply by reversing the inequalities, provided that the stability condition of equation (30) is still satisfied. It is possible to find such parameters.
The reason for the complexity of the results should be apparent. A number of distinct effects can be identified:
(a) In the short run, when producers do not adjust their production levels, there are two effects, a risk effect and a mean income effect. Both of these may be of either sign. Since price and quantity are inversely related, a reduction in the variability of prices will actually increase the variability in income of farmers, unless the elasticity of demand is very low. This increase in the variability of income will lower producers' welfare. It will reduce it more the greater is their risk aversion. If the elasticity of demand is low, price stabilization will reduce the variability of farmers' income.
Mean expenditure by consumers on the given commodity may increase or decrease, again depending on the structure of demand. If the individual has a unit elastic demand curve, then mean expenditure will be unaffected. With a constant elasticity demand curve, expenditure is a convex or concave function of quantity consumed depending on whether the elasticity of demand is less or greater than unity, and thus, mean income of farmers increases or decreases as the elasticity of demand is less or greater than unity.
(b) In the long run, producers will adjust their effort, and this will affect the prices they receive. The magnitude of this response depends on the effect of price stabilization on the mean value of the marginal return to effort, and this need not move in the same direction as the mean value of utility. Whether it does or not depends on the whole shape of the utility function as well as on the shape of consumers' demand functions (which determines the effect of the change in effort on prices).
VIII. EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
So far, we have considered only consumers and producers; we have ignored the profits or losses of the stabilization authority. The 2. Newbery [19761 gives another example of Pareto inferior stabilization in which producers have a mean-variance utility function, which for small risk is equivalent to constant absolute risk aversion. magnitude of these depend on the costs of storage. If the initial situation were an equilibrium, where the price differential were just equal to the (marginal) cost of storage, so no storage was actually done, then the marginal profit of the stabilization authority from engaging in a small amount of storage (price stabilization) would be zero. Thus, our earlier analysis is directly applicable; under the conditions given in Section VII, where price stabilization made both producers and consumers worse off, we can now say unambiguously that stabilization leads to a Pareto inferior equilibrium.
More generally, we can write the (expected) profits from storage (assuming a zero interest rate, constant storage costs c, and that PI > P2) as (38) dr = S ,dp -dP 2 -as S ' 0. dS dS dS)
The model analyzed in previous sections implicitly assumed at the competitive equilibrium that there was just no storage, so d r(pc2p,P O)_ dS Hence, for small amounts of stabilization (or destabilization) we can ignore the profits or losses of the stabilization authority. More generally, however, we cannot; to analyze the effects of stabilization, we need to specify how the deficits of the stabilization authority are financed, and how the profits are allocated. For simplicity, and to make the most favorable case possible for price stabilization, we assume that all profits are distributed to producers.
There are two approaches we can take at this point. We can assume that in the initial situation, there was no storage. (There are thus two market failures-an absence of risk markets and an absence of an intertemporal arbitrage market.) We then consider the impact of a small amount of stabilization. The second approach is to assume that initially there is a competitive equilibrium level of storage, and ask what happens if that level is increased.3 (i) No storage initially. If there is no storage initially, in the high output state, the stabilization authority will have to purchase S units of the good; to finance this, it imposes a lump sum tax on producers in the amount p2(S)S. In the low output state, the buffer authority sells the stock, and distributes the profits, (ii) Deviations from competitive equilibrium with storage: a storage subsidy. Now, we assume that there is competitive storage; the government would like to stabilize prices beyond the level provided by the market. To this end, it imposes a storage subsidy in the amount T, financed by a lump sum tax on producers in the period in which the goods are placed in storage. We shall show that there are conditions in which such a tax makes both producers and consumers worse off; there are other conditions under which a storage tax makes producers and consumers better off.
In the market equilibrium The conditions for consumers remain unaffected. It is thus apparent that it is possible for both producers and consumers to be worse off, or both producers and consumers to be better off, as a result of the imposition of a storage subsidy (tax). This is a special example of a more general result derived elsewhere [Newbery-Stiglitz, 1979b; Stiglitz, 1982] establishing that, in the absence of a complete set of markets, with more than one commodity, the market equilibrium will be a constrained Pareto optimum only under very restricted conditions; in general there exists some policy (e.g., tax or subsidy, here on storage), which can make everyone better off.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although there is little doubt that producers in less developed countries face considerable risk from the fluctuations in the agricultural prices which they receive, there is considerable controversy concerning whether any of the various proposals for stabilizing these prices would be desirable.
On the one hand, there is a widespread belief that since agricultural markets are competitive, they will provide an efficient level of storage activity (and hence an efficient level of price stabilization). We have shown that this belief is not well founded: we have identified conditions under which some intervention in the market could make everyone better off.4
On the other hand, we have also shown that the widespread belief in the desirability of stable prices may also not be well founded, when there are exogenous sources of risk and when there are incomplete or absent risk markets. In particular, it is possible that the stabilization of commodity prices may lead both producers and consumers to be worse off. An implication of this result is that under these circumstances, further destabilization of prices would make consumers and producers better off. The conditions under which stabilization is Pareto inferior include cases where, as a result of the destabilization, effort on the part of farmers is reduced in the long run; the reduction in average supplies makes consumers worse off, even though they have gained somewhat from the reduction in risk. Alternatively, there are conditions under which stabilization may make both groups better off. In still other cases, one group gains at the expense of the other.
The analysis of the response of farmers to price stabilization constitutes the third important contribution of this note. Again, we have shown that the widespread belief that such general equilibrium responses modify (reduce) the short-run effects, but do not qualitatively change them, is also not well founded. We have shown how, under certain circumstances, they may amplify the short-run responses, while under other circumstances, the qualitative analysis is reversed: producers might gain in the short run but be worse off in the long run.
Finally, we need to emphasize (as we noted above) that these results are not perversities; they do not require unreasonable assumptions concerning the production functions, utility functions of producers, or utility functions of consumers. Nor do they arise from a failure of stability conditions to hold. Rather, they are a reflection of the fact that risky markets with incomplete insurance may behave in ways that are fundamentally different from conventional markets.
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